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A conversation with Richard Lynn

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ABSTRACT

This special issue - *Evolution of race and sex differences in intelligence and personality: Tribute to Richard Lynn at eighty* – testifies to his many research interests over time, where Richard often pioneered. To mention a few examples, he clarified the confusion about the existence of an average sex difference in IQ, by demonstrating that children below 15 do not show the later adult sex difference. More importantly, Richard was the first to establish average IQs for all countries with more than 40.000 people, and then, with Tatu Vanhanen, illustrated the impressive predictive power of these IQs for understanding essential aspects of a nation's economical and social infrastructure. Richard was also the first to realise that classical eugenic measures do not suffices to avert serious consequences of dysgenics and to suggest that modern reproductive technologies may entail better eugenic potentials.

The present conversation provides sufficient details to get a glimpse of the person behind these pioneering efforts this and of his courage. As a prominent member of the London School of Differential Psychology he paints broad consequential strokes on our deeper understanding of human nature and what makes civilizations rise and fall. The behavioural sciences need extraordinary people like him.

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HN: Let us begin with your roots. Where are they?

RL: They are all from the east of England. My father's family are Viking stock from North Yorkshire and were small trade people until my father obtained a scholarship to King's College, London. My mother's family are from the southeast and are Saxon stock from the North plain of Germany.

HN: And your childhood: it is often said that our early years are the formative period of our lives. Were yours particularly favourable for future achievement?

RL: Not at all. I was born to a single mother of quite average intelligence, and it has typically been found that children born and brought up in these circumstances are disadvantaged. However, I do not subscribe to this conventional view. I believe the genes we inherit are much more important determinants of our life than our early years.

HN: So were your genes particularly favourable?

RL: They were certainly better than my environment. My father was Sydney Cross Harland and was one of the leading plant geneticists of the 1920s – 1940s. His specialism was cotton, on which he wrote the standard text *The Genetics of Cotton*, and for which he was elected a Fellow of the Royal Society. He was a friend of most of the big names in genetics of his

* Tel.: +45 87680456; mob. +45 24241655. *E-mail address:* helmuthnyborg@msn.com day, including Ronald Fisher, J.B.S. Haldane, and Julian Huxley. He died in 1981. His obituary appeared in *The Times* on November 18 of that year, and concluded "his distinguished career as an applied botanist was marked by a remarkable blend of the agricultural and the academic; for although he made outstanding contributions to the improvement of tropical crops, most notably cotton, his work also had a profound influence on evolutionary theory and the understanding of gene complexes".

HN: In addition to transmitting half his genes, did your father have a significant environmental influence on you during your childhood and adolescence?

RL: No. My parents split up when I was quite young. I did not see anything of my father during my childhood and adolescence because in my early childhood he was working in Trinidad as Director of the Imperial Cotton Research Institute. He was sacked from this position in 1937. My father had an aptitude for annoying people in authority, which I seem to have inherited. Fortunately, he had a marketable skill as a plant breeder and secured a position in Peru as Director of the Institute of Genetics, with the task of reviving cotton which had been attacked by a virus. I did not meet my father until 1949, when he returned to Britain as Professor of Genetics at the University of Manchester.

HN: Did you see much of him and did he influence you from this time onwards?

RL: We met about once a year. I have certainly been influenced by my father's ideas, especially his conviction that our lives are much influenced by our genes, and also the importance he attached to eugenics. He was one of the signatories of *The Geneticists' Manifesto*, drawn up in 1939 by Hermann Muller (1939), which posed the question "How could the world's population be improved genetically?" My father has also served as a role model and has given me the confidence to advance theories that have sometimes been controversial.

HN: But you only received half your genes from your father. You received the other half from your mother and you said that she had quite average intelligence.

RL: Yes, but her father graduated in Botany as the top student of his year at Imperial College and entered the agricultural service of the British Colonial Office, whose task was to breed improved crops in the extensive British colonies. He ended up as Director of Agriculture in Trinidad, and it was in the small British community of botanical scientists in Port of Spain that my mother and father met in the late 1920s. However, unlike my father who was a workaholic and spent his evenings poring over his data on cross-bred strains and writing them up for journals, my grandfather was quite lazy and preferred to play bridge in his club. I seem to have inherited the workaholic gene from my father.

HN: Tell me now about your childhood and adolescence.

RL: I was born in February 1930 and brought up in Bristol. I went to the Bristol Grammar School, but although my family had all been scientists, I did not find school science interesting. The subject I liked best was history. At the end of my school career I won a scholarship to the University of Cambridge, but I did not go up straight away. At this time all 18 year olds were conscripted into the armed services and in July, 1949, I received my call up papers requiring me to report for military service. It was not a future to which I particularly looked forward. Remarkably, the army decided I would make a good officer and I was duly commissioned second lieutenant. I was put in charge of the training of new conscripts. One of the things I had to do was to teach them how to use a rifle. I had never found any difficulty in this, but I was surprised to find that the new conscripts found this very hard. Generally they failed to hit the target at all. I used to give them a demonstration of how it was done, and the sergeant would bring the target and show it to them with five neat little holes in the bull's eye. They would gather round with exclamations of "Cor, blimey, look at the officer's". I realised later that this apparently simple task must be g loaded.

HM: So then you went up to Cambridge. How did you like Psychology there?

RL: Not much. When I started, the Professor was Sir Frederic Bartlett. He was already renowned for his books Psychology and Primitive Culture (1923) and Remembering (1932). I dutifully read these books and could not find anything much of interest in either of them. Apart from Bartlett, information theory was the dominant research paradigm. The theory was taken from communication engineers who used it to analyse the transmission of information, as for instance along a telephone line. The Cambridge people applied this model to explain the transmission of information through the nervous system. The two leaders of this group were William Hick, who published his famous paper On the rate of gain of information in 1953, and Donald Broadbent. I came to know Broadbent quite well and we remained on friendly terms up to his death. However, we did not have much of a meeting of minds. His caste of mind was for developing micro-theories phenomena, whereas I have always preferred broad brush macro-theories.

HN: I think Bartlett must have been quite elderly when you were a student, so you did not have to endure him for that long?

RL: Yes, in 1952 Oliver Zangwill was appointed to the professorship. I looked forward to this new broom and eagerly read his book An Introduction to Modern Psychology that had been published in 1950. I was not impressed by this slim volume. It ran to only 220 pages and about 60,000 words and the very idea that it was possible to provide an adequate account of psychology in such a short book seemed absurd. What was the point, I wondered, of writing such a book? I found to my dismay that Zangwill had an uncritical acceptance of psychoanalysis and even wrote that "as a result of Freud's researches, psychology today differs from psychology of fifty years ago in a manner so fundamental as to justify the comparison with biology before and after Darwin". I thought that regarding Freud as comparable in stature and achievement to Darwin was preposterous. My chief interest became the work on intelligence done at University College, London, developed by Charles Spearman, Cyril Burt and Raymond Cattell, and extended to personality by Cattell and Hans Eysenck. I thought this was much more interesting than the experimental psychology that was being done at Cambridge. I took the final exams in 1953 and did my best to conceal the antipathy I had developed for Cambridge experimental psychology. Apparently I succeeded as I was awarded the Passingham Prize, which is given annually for the best psychology student of the year. On the basis of this I was awarded a three year research studentship to work for a Ph.D. I decided to examine the relation between anxiety, intelligence and educational attainment in school children. I completed my Ph.D in the spring of 1956 and was disconcerted to be told by Zangwill that he had appointed Sir Cyril Burt as my external examiner and himself as the internal. I was a bit alarmed at having Burt as my external examiner because he had recently failed two Ph.D. students from Cambridge. However, the viva went well and he passed my thesis.

HN: So then you needed a job.

RL: Yes, and I obtained a lectureship at the University of Exeter. I was now to enter the wilderness years and did not succeed in doing anything that I considered significant for the next twelve years. In 1959 I published a paper Environmental conditions affecting intelligence, in which I said that it was now established that genetic factors are the major determinant of intelligence, but that environmental factors are also involved. I proposed that these consisted of the quality and quantity of cognitive stimulation from others in the family. I suggested that this explained the tendency for only children to have the highest IQs, and for IQs to decline with increasing family size, and also that eldest and youngest children have higher average IQs than those in the middle of the family. I sent the paper to Sir Cyril Burt, who replied with a friendly letter saying that he agreed with me. After this, I corresponded with Sir Cyril from time to time and I always found him very friendly and helpful.

HN: Your theory of the quality and quantity of cognitive stimulation from others in the family as the environmental determinant of intelligence sounds like the so-called *Zajonc* effect.

RL: Yes, Zajonc later formulated a very similar theory and managed to get his name attached to it. However, I do not find this annoying because I now think that Joseph Rogers, Boruch, Stoms, and DeMoya (1991) has disproved the theory.

HN: What did you do next?

RL: I fell under the spell of Hans Eysenck's theory that he published in 1957 in his book *The Dynamics of Anxiety and Hysteria*. In this he extended Hull's theory to individual differences. He proposed that extraverts generate Hull's concept of reactive inhibition more rapidly than introverts. From this assumption he derived a lot of deductions, for which he provided evidence in his book. One of the most important of these was that introverts would form conditioned Pavlovian anxiety reactions more rapidly than extraverts, and one of his researchers named Cyril Franks demonstrated that this was so. On the basis of this result, Eysenck proposed that children become socialised by developing anticipatory anxiety reactions to disapproval and punishment, and that this process would occur more rapidly in introverts.

HN: This theory of Eysenck's was obviously very ambitious.

RL: Indeed. But I love big theories, and this was huge. It embraced Pavlovian neurophysiological concepts, Hull's behaviour system, the introversion–extraversion personality dimension, the social concepts of tough-mindedness and tender-mindedness, and political attitudes. I was enthralled by the theory and began testing some of the deductions that could be made from it.

HN: And how did this go?

RL: Some of them worked but others didn't. In 1959 I wrote up a paper on one of those that worked, and sent it to Hans Eysenck He replied very warmly and said he would lend me some apparatus if I wanted to do some more work. He invited me to London to collect this and stay the night with him and Sybil, which I readily accepted. Talking with Hans was a real meeting of minds and unlike anything I had experienced before. I did some more work and published several papers on Eysenck's theory. I extended it to the deterioration of performance with age and proposed that this could be explained by an increase in reactive inhibition. Remarkably, in 1960 it was published in *Nature*.

During the 1960s, I worked on a variety of topics, including teaching two year olds to read and Russian psychology, but none of them led anywhere, and I became quite depressed with my failure to make any significant progress in my academic career.

HN: This brings us to 1967, when you quit the University of Exeter and took up a position in Ireland.

RL: Yes, I was appointed research professor at the Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI) in Dublin, where I worked until 1972. The brief was to carry out research on the economic and social problems of the country. So I settled down to investigate the economic and social problems of Ireland and think about what contribution I could make to finding public policies that would help solve them. The major problem was the economic backwardness, and when I researched the literature it was not long before I discovered that the Irish had a low average IQ. So I formulated the theory that the low IQ was likely a significant reason for the economic backwardness. The solution for this problem was obvious. What was needed was a set of eugenic policies that would raise the Irish IQ.

HN: This sounds a bit scary!

RL: Indeed. I reflected on the likely headlines I would get if I wrote one of the monographs that the ESRI produced analysing the problem and its solution. Headlines like *Professor advocates sterilizing the mentally retarded and incentives for graduates to have more children*. I didn't see these going down well. Ireland is a deeply conservative and Catholic country and the Catholics had been the only group that opposed eugenic programs in the first half of the twentieth century, when everyone else thought these were sensible. Virtually no-one supported eugenic programs any more and anyone who proposed doing so would be accused of being a Nazi.

HN: And how did you deal with this problem?

RL: I chickened out! I did not think I could go public on this, so I sat on it for 35 years. It was not until 2002 when I published *IQ* and the Wealth of Nations with Tatu Vanhanen that I set out the theory. Nevertheless, I did write something on the issue in a circumspect way. In 1968 I published *The Irish Brain Drain*. It reported research showing that there was a high rate of emigration of graduates from Ireland, and warned that this would reduce the average IQ of the remaining population.

I looked next at some of the demographic and epidemiological characteristics of Ireland to see if I could find any problems I could tackle. The first thing I noticed was that the Irish have an exceptionally high rate of psychosis. I knew that chronic hospitalised psychotics, consisting mainly of those with simple schizophrenia and retarded depression, have a low level of anxiety. I wondered whether a low level anxiety in the population might explain the high rate of psychosis and looked at other data that might corroborate the theory. I took the 18 economically developed nations for which there were reliable statistics and examined calorie consumption, coronary heart disease, caffeine and cigarette consumption as indices of low anxiety, and suicide rates, alcohol consumption, and road accident death rates as indices of high anxiety. I factor analysed the inter-correlations and found a general factor that accounting for about 50% of the variance and identified this as anxiety. The final step was to treat the nations as if they were individuals and use the data to score the nations on the anxiety factor. The result was that Ireland emerged as the nation with the lowest level of anxiety.

HN: How about the other nations? Could you find any pattern there?

RL: Yes, the northern Europe nations also had low anxiety, while the southern European nations and Japan came out as the high anxiety nations. It seemed likely that there are genetic differences in anxiety among the northern and southern subraces of Europe, and between Japan and Europeans. This was my first excursion into the thorny field of racial differences.

HN: This was quite a sophisticated study. I wonder how many people understood it and how it was received.

RL: There were certainly a lot of people who did not understand it. However, it was received quite well by the more sophisticated. Sir Cyril Burt wrote a generous introduction – "what I should like chiefly to commend are the methods he has adopted". I believe this was the last thing that Sir Cyril wrote. Hans Eysenck was enthusiastic and it was this that inspired Hans and Sybil to begin collecting questionnaire data for neuroticism and extraversion, and later for psychoticism, from numerous countries that was to occupy them for the next thirty years or so.

HN: And how has your theory survived these last forty years?

RL: The theory has survived quite well among researchers on cross-cultural differences in personality. In 1985 Phil Rushton extended the theory in his book *Race, Evolution and Behavior* in which he reported that North East Asians obtain higher scores on anxiety than Europeans, confirming my conclusion that the Japanese have a high level of anxiety. David Lester (2000) expanded the theory further and found that it held up in a data set of 32 nations. Geert Hofstede and Robert McCrae (2004, p. 59) have written that "A breakthrough in the study of national cultures was Richard Lynn's book *Personality and National Character*" and have confirmed the same national differences in anxiety.

HN: We have come to the year 1972 and you were soon to leave Dublin.

RL: Yes, I had completed my work on national differences in anxiety and was keen to develop my ideas on national and racial differences in intelligence. But because I had discovered the low IQ in Ireland, I did not think it possible to do this while I was in Dublin. So I had to look for a new base. Then in the fall of 1971 the University of Ulster advertised for a professor to set up a psychology department. I thought this would suit me, so I sent in an application, was offered the job, and accepted.

So in 1972 I moved to Ulster and began my work on national and racial differences in intelligence. I began publishing papers on this in 1977 when I estimated the mean IQ in Japan at 106.6 (in relation to an American mean of 100), and the mean IQ of the Chinese in Singapore at 110. The next year I published a review of national and racial IQs. I continued to collect IQs for countries all over the world. I concluded that with the IQ of Europeans set at 100, the North East Asians have an IQ of 106, the South East Asians have an IQ of 90, the Native American Indians have an IQ of 89, and the IQ of sub-Saharan Africans have an IQ around 70.

In 1980 I published my theory that these race differences evolved when early humans migrated out of Africa into temperate and then into cold environments. These were more cognitively demanding, and so the peoples who settled in North Africa and South Asia, and even more the Europeans and the North East Asians, had to evolve higher IQs to survive.

HN: Then in 2002, you used these national and racial IQs in your book *IQ and the Wealth of Nations,* which you wrote in collaboration with Tatu Vanhanen.

RL: Yes, Tatu Vanhanen is a political scientist in Finland and has a good knowledge of economics. We got in touch in 2000, met in London and talked about using my national IQs to explain the huge differences in living standards between the economically developed countries and the third world. We found that the correlation between national IQs and per capita income was r = 0.68, so national IQs explained about half the variance in per capita income. The other half can be largely explained by the degree to which nations have free market economies and natural resources.

HN: How was the book received?

RL: It had the usual reaction to which I have become accustomed. Some hated it, some loved it. Among those who hated it was Earl Hunt, who described the national IQs as "meaningless", while Susan Barnett and Wendy Williams, said they were "virtually meaningless".

Others saw my national IQs as opening up a new field in which national differences in intelligence have explanatory power for a wide range of social and economic phenomena. In 2009, Heiner Rindermann and Steve Ceci described the calculation of national IQs as "... a new development in the study of cognitive ability: Following a century of conceptual and psychometric development in which individual and group (socioeconomic, age, and ethnic) differences were examined, researchers have turned their attention to national and international differences in cognitive competence to predict a variety of outcomes: societal development, rate of democratization, population health, productivity, gross domestic product (GDP), crime, health and longevity, infant mortality, and wage inequality". From 2005, numerous papers have been published on a variety of correlates of national IQs.

In 2010, in collaboration with Gerhard Meisenberg, I integrated all the international studies of scores in reading comprehension, math and science understanding. We put this on a common metric for 108 nations and showed that they are perfectly correlated (r = 1.0) with national IQs. I doubt whether there is any-one who now disputes that my national IQs are valid.

HN: In 2005, you wrote another book on race differences in intelligence, *The Global Bell Curve*?

RL: This took as its starting point The Bell Curve, in which Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray in 1994 showed in that in the United States there is a racial hierarchy in which Europeans have the highest IQ and perform best for earnings, socioeconomic status and a range of social phenomena, Hispanics come next, while Blacks do least well. In The Global Bell Curve I examined whether similar racial intelligence and socio-economic hierarchies are present in other parts of the world and documented that they are. They are found in Europe. Africa. Latin America, the Caribbean, Southeast Asia, Australia and New Zealand. It is invariably the Europeans and North East Asians who are at the top of these racial hierarchies. These are followed by the brown skinned peoples who occupy intermediate positions, e.g. the Coloureds and Indians from the sub-continent in Africa, the Mulattos and Mestizos in Latin America, Indians in Europe, and light skinned Blacks in the United States, who come in the middle of the IQ and socio-economic hierarchies, while the dark skinned African Blacks and Native American Indians invariably come at the bottom of the hierarchies. In Australia and New Zealand, it is the lighter skinned Europeans and Chinese who are at the top of the IQ and socio-economic hierarchies, while the darker skinned Aborigines and Maoris are at the bottom. In South-East Asia in Singapore, Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Thailand, it is invariably the Chinese who have higher IQs than the indigenous peoples and outperform them in education, earnings, wealth and

socio-economic status. These colour-related social hierarchies are so inescapable that sociologists and anthropologists have coined the term *pigmentocracy* to describe them. A pigmentocracy is a society in which wealth and social status are related to skin colour. I argued that intelligence differences provide the best explanation for the racial hierarchies that are consistently present in all multiracial societies.

HN: I would like to turn now to your work on the increases in intelligence that occurred during the twentieth century.

RL: My first work on this appeared in 1982, when I published a paper showing that the IQ in Japan had increased by 7 IQ points from those born in 1910 to those born in 1969. I have published several more papers on the increase of IQs. My last one in 2009 showed that in Britain it has recently come to an end among children aged 13 years and older, although it is still present in younger children. I have also considered the problem of why IQs have increased and published a paper in 1990 arguing that improvements in nutrition have been the main factor responsible for the IQ rise.

HN: You have also worked on sex differences in intelligence. How did this come about?

RL: In all fields of scholarship we have to take a lot on trust. If all previous scholars are agreed on something, we take it for granted that they must be right. All the experts from at least World War 1 had stated that there is no sex difference in intelligence. In the following years numerous scholars whom I respected repeated this assertion. For instance, Herrnstein and Murray wrote in *The Bell Curve* that "The consistent story has been that men and women have nearly identical IQs".

I had no reason to doubt this consensus, but in 1992 I was shaken when Dave Ankney and Phil Rushton independently published papers showing that men have larger brains than women, even when these are controlled for body size and weight. It was evident that these results presented a problem. It is well established that brain size is positively related to intelligence at a correlation of about 0.4. As men have larger brains than women, men should have a higher average IQ than women. Yet all the experts were agreed that males and females have the same intelligence.

I grappled with this problem for about six months. I went through dozens of studies and the experts seemed to be right that males and females have the same intelligence. Then at last I found the solution. When I looked at the studies in relation to the age of the samples being tested, I found that males and females do have the same intelligence up to the age of 15 years, as everyone had said. But I found that from the age of 16 years onwards, males begin to show higher IQs than females and that by adulthood, the male advantage reaches about 5 IQ points, entirely consistent with their larger average brain size. I published this solution to what I called the Ankney-Rushton anomaly in 1994.

HN: And how was your solution received?

RL: Most people ignored it, including Art Jensen in his 1998 book *The g Factor*. He concluded that "the sex difference in psychometric *g* is either totally nonexistent or is of uncertain direction and of inconsequential magnitude".

I continued to publish papers showing that up to the age of 15 years males and females have approximately the same IQ except for a small male advantage on the visualisation abilities, but from the age of 16 years males begin to show greater intelligence, but most people continued to assert that men and women have equal intelligence. In 2006, Stephen Ceci and Wendy Williams published an edited book *Why aren't more women in Science*? They brought together fifteen experts to discuss this question. They began by saying "We have chosen to include all points of view", but remarkably none of the contributors presented the case that men have higher intelligence than women, and that high intelligence is required to make a successful career in science. Several of the contributors asserted that there are no sex differences in intelligence.

The only person who attacked my theory was Nick Mackintosh. In 1996 he contended that the Progressive Matrices is an excellent measure of intelligence and of Spearman's *g*, that it is known that there is no sex difference on the Progressive Matrices, and therefore that my claim is refuted. He made no mention of my maturation theory that it is only from the age of 16 years that males begin to show higher IQs than females.

In response to Mackintosh's criticism I collaborated with Paul Irwing in carrying out meta-analyses of sex differences on the Progressive Matrices in general population samples and in university students (Lynn & Irwing, 2004). We found that in general population samples there is no sex difference up to the age of 15 years, but among adults, men have a higher IQ than women by 5 IQ points. Among university students, we found the male IQ advantage is 4.6 IQ points.

HN: Still, you did have some supporters for your theory that men have a higher average IQ than women. I myself came out in support of your theory.

RL: You did (Nyborg, 2005), and in the next few years several people published data supporting my theory, including Juri Allik; Doug Jackson and Phil Rushton; Roberto Colom, and Gerhard Meisenberg. By 2010, numerous studies had shown that men have a higher IQ than women. I believe this is now accepted by all serious scholars. But, of course, there are plenty of unserious scholars who have never bothered to read the literature on this issue.

HN: Let us move onto your work on eugenics.

RL: I became interested in eugenics when I was a student in the 1950s. I read the papers of several psychologists in the United States, and of Sir Cyril Burt, Sir Godfrey Thompson and Ray Cattell in Britain, showing that the average IQ of the population was declining because people with low IQs were having more children than those with high IQs. I thought this must be an enormously serious problem. But it was not until the early 1990s that I began to work on eugenics.

I have published several papers showing that dysgenic fertility for intelligence in the United States and Britain, and one showing that there is also dysgenic fertility for moral character. In 1996 I published *Dysgenics: Genetic Deterioration in Modern Populations*, which set out the evidence that modern populations have been deteriorating genetically from around 1880 in respect of health, intelligence and moral character.

In 2001, I published a sequel Eugenics: A Reassessment. This begins with a historical introduction giving an account of the ideas of Francis Galton and the rise and fall of eugenics in the 20[th] century. I then discuss the objectives of eugenics and identify these as the elimination of genetic diseases, and the improvement of intelligence and moral character. This is followed by a consideration of how eugenic objectives can be achieved using the methods of selective reproduction and concludes that there is not much scope for these. Finally, I discuss the how eugenic objectives could be achieved by the "New Eugenics" of biotechnology using embryo selection and how these are likely to be developed in the twenty-first century. I conclude by predicting the inevitability of a future eugenic world in which couples will select genetically desirable embryos for implantation and there will be huge improvements in the genetic quality of the populations of economically developed countries where these technologies are adopted.

I have continued to publish papers on genetic deterioration. I extended this in a study with John Harvey to an estimate of the decline of the world's IQ caused by the high fertility in third world low IQ countries. We estimated that the world's IQ deteriorated genetically by 0.86 IQ points in the years 1950–2000.

HN: You have also published work on racial and ethnic differences in personality.

RL: Yes, in 2002 I took up the problem that Dick Herrnstein and Charles Murray noted in *The Bell Curve* that while racial and ethnic differences in intelligence can explain a number of the differences in educational attainment, crime, welfare dependency, rates of marriage, etc., they cannot explain the totality of these differences. They concluded that there must be some additional factor that also contributes to these. I proposed that some of the residual disparities are attributable to differences in psychopathic personality. I showed that psychopathic personality is highest among Blacks and Native Americans, next highest in Hispanics, lower in Whites and lowest in East Asians.

HN: Your most recent book is on the intelligence of the Jews. How did you get interested in this?

RL: Some years ago I read that about a third of the Nobel Prizes won by Germany in the years 1901–1939 had been awarded to Jews. I checked out the numbers of Jews in Germany and found they were about 0.85 per cent of the population. I reflected that

Jews must have had a high IQ to achieve this astonishing overrepresentation. I had a look at the research on the intelligence of the Jews and found that a number of studies had been published reporting that Jews do indeed have high IQs. These were all quite old. Comparative studies of the IQs of different peoples have become increasingly taboo in recent decades. I investigated the Jewish IQ and estimated the Ashkenazi IQ at approximately 110, and the IQ of Oriental Jews at 91. I also wondered whether the Jews might have some personality characteristic, such as a strong work ethic, which might contribute to their high achievements, but could not find any evidence for this in a paper published in 2008 with Satoshi Kanazawa.

I then read a number of papers in economics and sociology journals on the educational attainments, earnings and socioeconomic status of Jews in the United States, and found numerous studies going back to the first half of the twentieth century reporting that these are all higher in Jews than in gentile whites. But the strange thing is that none of these mentioned that the explanation for the remarkable achievements of the Jews could be that they are more intelligent than white gentiles.

The more of these papers I read, the more it became apparent that a job needed to be done investigating whether Jews have a high IQ and commensurate educational attainments, earnings and socio-economic status in all countries in which Jews are, or have been, present. I have documented that this has been so in my book *The Chosen People: Jewish Intelligence and Achievements*.

HN: I have one final question. How would you like to be remembered?

RL: I hope my obituarists will write something like "Some loved him, some hated him, but everyone accepted that he kept the faith and told the truth as he saw it".

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